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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRICH filed 
on August 31, 2010 a contended verified complaint, with 
two Exhibits A and B, consisttltn~ of 14 pages, Only respondent 
THOMAS ULRI[H signed the so denominated verification. ( R: 01-14) 
Exhibit A was averrred tO be "A true and correct copy 
of the deed to the Ulrich Propetty." (, R; 3, 9-10) But the 
referenced deed was not signed by the stated trustees, who 
were grantors to the respondents, nor did such Exhibit A., refer-
renced, include nor make appellant nor his real property of 40 
acres, known and referred to as "The Peacock Property" which 
on the date of the complaint's filing was owned in undivided 
interests by Milan and Diana Cheyovich of California, &f an un-
divided one-fourth (~) ownership, and the undivided remainder, 
of the undivided 3/4 ownership owned then by Appellant. 
Exhibit B, attached was a nof:~_rized copy of a Corporation 
Warranty Deed, dated .June 9th 1994, from TETON WEST CORPORATION, 
signed by its President GEORGE C. HATCH, a§ Grantor, conveying 
40 acres to: "JACK LEE McLEAN, Trustee of the JACK LEE McLEAN 
family trust, as to an undivided one-fourth inter-
est; MILAN CHEYOVICH and DIJ\NA CHEYOVICH, Trustees 
of the CHEYOVICH FAMILY TRUST; -a£3 -"to an undivided 
one-fourth interest; WAYNE DAWSON, TRustee of the 
DAWSON FAMILY TRUST'_ as to an undivided one- fourth 
interest; and TARGHEE POWDER EMPORIUM, LTD, as to 
an undivided one-fourth interest ... " ("R: 12-14) 
''On information and belief;' per paragraph 4 and 5, respon-
dent tT.f:l'l:D:MA'S ULRICH averred that "Bach claims an interest in the 
following described real property located in T~ton County, Idaho , 
<tNt£1 tc,$1,;Qt~~t<e;tx·a~t li~-"~sou:t I} 1J L: the· ·uxr-.5 elf Rr1:-ope'1'.t y( . e-the: :·: :J1ctc h: .Pr;__o:n e rty·' ) ; " 
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that "a tnae and correct copy of the deed through which Bach 
and others originally obtained right to the Bach Property is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B'.' .. "The named Defendants may also 
claim some right or interest in the Bach Property." ( R: 03-4) 
No other "named Defendants" were stated, designated nor 
made defendants to the complaint, nor ever referred to again. 
Paragraph 8 of the complaint averred: "The Ulrich Property 
Easement is denoted in the deed to the Bach Property." f R: 04) 
No such designation, description nor statement is shown on 
Exhibit B, as "The Ulrich Prop~rty Easement." In fact, Exhibit 
~' dated June 9, 1994 was recorded in Teton County as Instrument 
No. 11646~ and makes no mention, reference nor identification 
of the respondents in any paragraph or language. (. R: 012-14) 
Moreover, Exhibit A, unsigned by the trustee grantor to the 
respondents is date filed December 11, 19 9 6 (two years, six months 
and two days after Appellant's undivided title, joint venture, 
was recorded; Exhibit A, was file/recorded as Teton Instrument 
125858. (1R: 10-11) Such instrument 125858 makes no mention, ref-
erence nor identification of appellant nor of the other undivided 
one fourth owners trusts in the Peacock 40 acres. Nor does any 
averment in respondents' complaint so tie in or make appellant as 
a party or contractual thrid party to the respondents said real 
property acquired ~ta Exhibit A. 
The four (4) counts set forth in the respond~nts' complaint 
seek per I.C. 6-401, et seq quiet title to "the Ulrich Property 
Easement',' and that its "dominant and superior to any right, title, 
claim or interest held by Defendants in the Bach Property"; peJ£ 
\ GC:HJNT'' r:~ J:n· Gouht/' X';E\ -respondents seek per Ir,;c. 10-1201 et seq 
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''a declaratory judgment against Defendants declaring that 
Fllaintiffs are entitle to a declartory judgment against Def~ 
endants declaring that Plaintiffs' right, title, claim and 
interest 1n the Ulrich Property Easement is dominant and 
supeiior to any right , title, claim or interest held by 
Defendants in the Bach Property,'' c·R 95) 
Respondents' COUNT I:II ;ts labelled PPRELI'MJ'NARY' INJUNCTION" 
and averred: 
"16. Plaintiff Thomas H. Ulrich telephonedBllahhc::,rg_n_t_~pli:il 
24. 1010 to inform him that survey·ors would be presentc::,rg_n 
the Ulrich Property Easement to s~rvey the easement to 
prepare for the im~rovements. · 
17. Bach repeatedly insisted that Plaintiffs have no easement 
abd threatened Plaintiff£ Thomas H. Ulrich that if survey·ors 
entered onto the easement th{:l,t he would call the sheriff.' s 
office and charge the surve y·ors with trespassing. 
18. Any such interference and/or resttiction of the Ulrich 
Property Easement will cause irreparable harm and injury 
to Plaintifffs. Plaintiffs are in the process of obtaining 
an approval for development of a subid:vision from Teton 
County and such process requires the Sl..HVey' and improvement 
of the Ulrich Property Easement. Through this process, Plain" 
tiffs are subjectto upcoming deadlines before which the sur,-. 
vey· of the Ulrich Propery' Easement must be completed. J:f 
Pl~intiff cannot obtain ~ survey of the Ulrich Property Ease~en~ 
ment prior to such deadlines,"Plaintiffs will be unable to 
complete their subdivision application and will be irreoar" 
ably harmed. 
19, Plaintiffs are entitled during the pendency of this act" 
tionto a temporary restraining order and/or pr~liminary in,.. 
junctionemjoining and restraining the De.fendants .fr~m'rdnter,.. 
~ering with in any manner and/or re~tricting the usage of 
the Ulrich Property Easement as a means of ingress and egress 
from the Ulrich Property, including but not limited to any 
interference w·i th the survey•ing of the Ulrich property· Ease,.. 
ment forpurpose of improving the ease:ment in the future.'" 
C_rR: 06,..07) 
Count IV of the complaint averred/sought a :Per:manent inJ unc,.. 
t ion, and? w·i thout any other Couh t nu:rnb·er ~ l?laiht_iff§ sought 
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tJDJ recover their reasonable attorney:~s fees and costs per 
I.C. 10-12-10, 12-121, and I.R.C.P. Rules 54(d) and 54(e). (R: 07) 
Also on August 31, 2010, Respondents filed~a MOTION 
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, based upon the purported verified 
compliait, with a discussed date with the district court 
judge such motion would be heard ptember 7, 2010. (R: 015718) 
But Plaintiffs and their attorneys failed to have Appellant 
personally saerved, nor did they attempt to serve nor ever serve 
amy of the jmint venturers named in Exhibit B of their complaint. 
Respondents appeared before the district judge on September 
7, 2010, no reporter was present to record the proceeding, 
but the court's minutes revealRespondents' attorney admitted 
that no personal service had been made upon Appellant Bach, 
claimed his clients had a "P&Z issue" which required resolution, 
"all submitted by next week (or) would miss October hearing date." 
The district court held there was "No showing of immediate and irrec-"" 
parable 1o s s if not decided in the next 10 days" & set a pre 1 imi·"--
nary injunction hearing on September 17, 2010 at lOa.m. (R~ 019) 
September 9, two days after the hearing of Sept 7, respon-
dents filed a MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. (R: 20-22) 
On September 16, 2010 Appellant made a Special Appearance, 
Contesting Lack of Personal Service and Personal Jurisdiction 
via twO (2) filed documents: 
1. MOTION FOR IRCP, Rule 12(b) (2) (4) (5); Rule 3(a) (1); 
Rule 3(b); Rule 4(d) (1), Etc., to Strike, Quash 
and/or Void Any Purported Service Upon Him, For 
Sanctions Against Plaintiff(s) and Counsel. 
2. MOTION TO PEREMPTORILY DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE GREGORY 
MUELLER, PER I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(l) (A) (B). 
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(SPECIAL NOTE: The foregoing two two (2) motions filed by 
Appellant September 16, are attached hereto as Augmented 
Clerks Transcripts, which per Mo[t,ion~·tor- be- ·-macae: via .I. A. R.. ·~. · 
Rules 30(a), Rule 30~} 30.2 and 32(c) (d), are referenced/iden-
tifies hereafter as "Aug R;"(then the page::;or-pages where they 
are inserted, can be found or disclosed.) 
As part of Appellant's Special appearanc~ motion, were 
two affidadivts, one of Gary Brett Byington, Ammon, Idaho, who 
was asked by Appellant to take care of Appellant's "animals, 
horses, dogs,etc., while (Appelili.ant) went to Southern California 
for a personal family trip and occasion'', but Brett Byington had 
not nor did not "ever reside, dwell or live in Teton County" 1 
with Appellant on the two dates and occasions, that a purported 
neighbor handed to Brett Appellant's :;~.U1pposedly mail in a 
large white postal priority sealed envelope. Brett Byington 
was "not empowered nor authorized to open" such envelope and 
left it for Appellant. (Aug,'R: 
Per Appellant's INITIAL MEMORANDUM, in support of his 
specially appearing motions, he cited two (2) Idaho Supreme Court 
cases:>which required the "VOIDING" of such inadequate· personal 
service efforts, to wit: Herr~Y V. Estay 146 Idaho 674, 201 P3d 
647 (2009) and Marcd Distrib., Iti~. v. Riehl 97 Idaho 853, 555 
P.-d 393 (1976). Appellant also argued in said initial memora-
ndum that respondents violated IR :·cp, RulE'.:~ 65 (AfO) required 
as due process and equal protection rights of Appellant, citing 
Lawrence Wholesale Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co. 89 Idaho 389, 405 P. 2d .) 
634. (Aug.R: 
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On September 17, 2010 at 1);)5 a.m. before the 
district court judge, all motions cam for hearing. As 
mo court reporter was present, the minutes of ~aid proceedings 
are set forth at (R: 23-28. Appellant requested ("wanted") 
a full hearing as to motion on special appearance. ( R: 28 
Respondent's attorney asked permission to have court bailiff 
persoanly serve Appellant with purported pleadings (handed to 
bailiff in a sealed envelope, which remained unopened until 
the bailiff placed the envelope in front of appellant. Appel-
lant objected to such irregular service (''R: 24). Even the 
judge did not see/know but assumed what was in sealed envelope. 
C:R: 25-26) 
The district court judge would notaacep~t· appellant's 
peremptory disqualification of him, and proceeded asking ques-
tions to determine whether as such judge, being disqualified, 
such disqualification motion was.tohinder, delay or obstruct 
justice . ., The judge found that such "mot ion was timely and appe 1-
lant was entitled to relief." ~Sucfi judge disqualified himself 
per IRCP, Rule 40(d) (1) and recessed the hearing! (''R : 27-28) 
An ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION was filed September 17, 
2010, but no time-i of its filing was entered. CfR: 29) On 
September 20, 2010 an ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT was entered:;t ,fhe case 
referred to the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, Distrid:t Judge 
for fur:ther proceedings. (TR: 31) On September 21, 2 010, at tor-
ney for respondent filed a recorded LIS PENDENS (Notice of Pen-
dency of Actiou)(~R: 32-34) No copy of said Lis Pendens was 
mailed, nor served upon appellant. 
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EArly afternoon~ Appellant, specially appear1ng, filed: 
a "NOTICE OF MOTIONS and MOTIONS re: 1. MOTION TO DISMISS 
':WT'IJH'='PREJUID ICE, IRCP, Rule 12 (b) ( 6) , etc. , ; 2. MOT ION FOR SUM-
M·.RY JUDGMENT, IRCP, Rule 56(b) (c); 3. Alernatively, MOTION 
FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, Rule 12 (c); &: MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 
COSTS AND FEES AGAINST PLAINTIFFS and THEIR COUNSEL, Rule ll(a) (1), 
ALL FOREGOING MOT IONS RE REQUESTED SUA SPONTE .,"not(ifc~g:'ffoT: Oct. 15. (Aug'.c~~~ 
The last paragraph of said Notice of Motions stated; 
"Defendant also moves hereby to strike any motion for pre-
liminary injunctions, etc., as presented, fnffa .. (as) no 
viable claims, no verification exists nor is basis presented, 
(no)aadrnissilbe or probative evidence was ever presented 
to have allowed Judge Moeller to consider issuing·dOI)Y OSC re 
temporaryrestraining orderss ket akibe even hearinga:my request 
for preliminary injunction." (Aug'"~: 
Within the memorandum Appellant further raised: 
"Foremost. equitable jurisdiction (quiet title1injunctive 
relief) will not be accorded, nor considered as within the 
jurisdiction of this Court 'when anadequate legal remedy is 
available.' Iron Eag!~- Development, LLC v. Quality D~si~ns 
Systems, Inc. 134 Idaho 357, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2009) .. ":'Aug 
·_R: 
Appellant's p()irited 1outr. :Respondent's Exhibit A was not not4nized by 
the designated trustee and was void; concluding: respondents "cannot 
comply with the pleading and evidentiary requirements. ¢i t_ing Read 
v. Harvey (2009) 147 Idaho 364. (Aug 'R: 
Appellant's memo-:randum lastly objected to and a'l:'gged 
that "ThiilReis no probable, nor credlble basis nor foTmal 
offer of proof by plaintiffs •• ,to show their standing, cap~ 
acities nor NON running of all statutes of ftaua;t::ldr:Fnitations, 
collateral estoppel issue and claim preclusions, etc, As a 
matter of fact and law, the present filing of such complaint 
is in bad faith, (with) unclean hands and flagrant legal 
ethical misconduct." (Aug.]~: 
The district court's Minutes of the hearing on motions, 
before Judge Darra;ro B. Simpson; such 'Minutes are ;,~s set forth 
inCR: 35~48) At the outset of the hiarlng, cotild not find an 
origin3,1 order~.,."order is not 1n original court file not in is it 
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1n the £ile that maintain(ed) in Bingham County nor does it 
a~pear it has been entered in the ROA." C R: ,36) 
After further review of the clerk's court file, arguments 
o£ w~e~her affiant was personally served and considering the 
Affidavit of Linday Moss, the court decide that ''Return of S~r-
vice appearsto comport so is determination (Appellant) was 
in fact served with the documents" with the judge deciding "will 
hear in objection to Storer's motion".(',R: 37-38) Without any 
testimony respondent's counsel argued the introduction of his 
then marked EXHIBITS, A, with new added page, B and D, etc, which 
respondent's counsel argued: "does not go to adimissibility-not 
revelant" Relevant to preliminaryinjunction; grantee jjsjslightly 
different." C R: 39-40) Another Exhibit PX C "offered for ill us t rat ion 
;~pur.poses, appellant objected "not illustration of anything that has 
/;been resolved-to set out road that isn't there,'' also "Lack of 
foundation" but respondent's counsel states that "red dotted line -~. 
illustrates the easement"; the Judge admitted said Exhibit PX C 
for illustrative purposes without even hearing any testimony, 
foundational showing nor~credibility to admit. (~R: 40) 
In the testimony presented via by the only witness called 
by respcnden~;: Michael Quinn, professional engineer; and during 
the questioning, objections and answers of Micha§l Quinn, Appel-
lant "m0ves for an orEier and Judgment of Dismissal of request for 
preliminary~ii;tjunction." (R::, 41-43) Appellant frequently objected 
to theotestimony on the basis of no subject matter jurisdiction, 
statute of limitations of 5 years and respondent having "adequate 
remedies at law". (':R: 44) Appellant wanted a bond of$100,000.00 
if preliminary injunction is granted and striking of pres~tly~ 
ordered injunctive orders protecting is propertyo C ,'R: 4'5_~46) 
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On October 29, 2010 at 1:59 p.m., a MEMORANDUM DECISION 
re: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIN AND DENYING 
BACH'S MOTION 'IFO.DISMISS, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION 
FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, and MOTION FOR SANCTION, COSTS AND , 
FEES, of 25 pages (~R: 47-73) along with/attached there~o EX-
HIBIT A, being an ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF WAYNE DAWSON'S MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, in Teton CV 2001-265, filed October 
2~, 2010at 1:04 p.m, of 21 pages (' R: 73-94) and EXHl3BIT B, being 
a copy of SECOND AMENDED aUDGMENT, in Teton CV 2001-265, filed 
October 29, 2010 at 1:04 p.m., of 3 pages) ( R: 95-99) were filed. 
Also on October 29, 2010 at 4:19p.m. an ORDER GRANTING n 
PRELIMIARY INJUNCTION was filed (TR:l00-104), teo (2) minutes 
after it was signed by Judge Simpson. ( R: 103) 
~CDTE:!: These two documents, said MEMORANDUM flee is ion and ORDER 
GRANTING PRELIMIANRY INJUNCTION, are two (2) challenged errors 
on/in thLs Appeal and will be addressed, infra, in detail and 
specificity . r 
On November 16, 2010, at 4:44p.m., Appellant filed 
his VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTERCL~JMS, conssiting of 11 pages. 
(TR: 105-115) Per said VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS, appel-
lant prefacing paragraph stated: 
"COMES NOW JOHN N. BACH, still preserving all special 
A~~~atAhc~$ h~fdih ~~d~, ahd i§§efting Nis opposiiton and 
objections to the sub~ect~matter and personal jurisdictions 
claimed and even temporarily found by the court applying 
herein, and does hereby, alternatively answer, deny and 
oppose the purported singularly verified complaint by solely 
Plaintiff Thomas H. Ulrich, who is without standing, capacity 
or validity to speak for, act or represent his claimed wife, 
MARY' M. ULRICH, as not (in) compl:iimce on her behalf per the 
Idah() Satute of"Frauds, written power of attorney or agency, 
h~s been stated, ~ma;de ~:( cohta±r:ed any,wHe:re, w·ith.in sa):d compl ,, 
a :tnt as presently, on f:t le here :tn. (.'R: 10 5) 
9 . 
Un(i$,r hJ~ a,ns:we;rs, paragraph "A. DENTAL OF GENERAL 
II 
ALLEGATIONS'''-'~ a,ppel,la,nt hr/pe.r his suo sequent paragraphs 1 through 
4 CJR; 1QS,.1,071 deny· all allegations of respondents' complaint. 
t>er the lP;st ,f!;ppellant!·s statement in his:::;pargraph 5 and his 
parag.raph 5 ~ followin$ he denies '•'that THOMAS H. ULRICH or his 
;c .>> hi-sino:nappea·ringw-i£e,clhit:ye any·.;rights, entitlement or claims/ 
causes of ac~ion for relief or redress as sought per para-
. graphs A, B, C, D, E, P & G of his said prayer. 
5. Ans·we.ring , opposing and objecting to the purported 
V.f3J\:£F+;CAT:CON, of' the complaint on page 9, · thereof, denies and 
objects Ctol each contended compliance statements and/or that 
form and ~ma,nne.r of notarization, is inaccurate and incorrect 
C_notl pe.rsonal knowledge of Thomas H. Ulrich." C R: 107) 
Appe llP,nt ~ per his paragraph ''B. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO 
13ACH .AND ALL COUNTS r, TI, TI·I & IV 11 , sets forth in 13 subpara-
graphs hi.s affir:ma,ti-ye defenses. (TR: 107·:-.113) (The veri:fi®d ave1:--
ment$ o£ a,ppel1,ant in his paragraph "B'', subpararaphs of: "B, 4," 
(S t at u t e o f. F r 13, u d s l ; 1' B , 5" CS t a tu t e o f L im i tat ions ) ; "B , 6" (fa i 1 -
ure of compliance with L c. S- 238}; '·'B, 7" (1 iab i 1 i ty of acts, 
conduct and d$ceptive -representations and barred per respondents 
doctrine of la,ches1; '''·B, 8,'' Cunclean hands, unw·illingess to do 
ecpitity ~ failure to comply w·ith express and implied covenants, 
duties P,nd obligP,tions· o.f good faith, fair dealings and lack of 
eyasions,. deceptions a,nd untruthfulness of averments, etc., as 
ftJ.ythe.r delinea,ted in sub.paragraphs El) thil.ough f) C R: 116-117); 
,.,... 
"B,lO, '~application of adverse possession, prescriptive.:use and 
restriciions, the plaintiffs accepted, agreed to and did bind, 
commit and obligated themselves to the complete ownership •. of John 
.. 
N. BACR. ''·4 are 'averred moreJGompletal 21 : ih,/:R,~ 10~~1-~.~Jl.]:.) • ) 
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Appellant's paragraphs ~B, 11, 12 & 13, of his 
affirmative defenses st~ted/averred under penalty of perjury 
of his own personal knowledge that: 
"li. As a direct, legal and resulting application of the 
foregoing affirmative defenses, per paragraphs B. 1, thr-
ough 10, supra, plainti(ffs) and each of them , alterna~ 
tively , jointly and most restrictively, are subject to the 
doctrines of: (a) promissory estoppel; b) estoppel in pais; 
c) quasi-estoppel; d) waiver or abandonment, and/or extin-
quishment of any',cla±ms' or rights to be asserted for any 60 
foot acess-egress or any other use easement across not just 
the most westerly portions of said 40 acres but not any ease ... t::~ci:': 
~ents, prescritpive rights, privileges or uses over or upon 
the entire 40 acres, which said 40 acres were not only subst-
antially fenced, enclosed and physically barred fro~:access, 
but earning, no trespassing signs, violators would be prose-
cuted and those that survivied would be shot agarn, were con-
stantly and continoulsy posted and replaced. 
12. There is another legal actions pending, not yet fina-
lized as to the most current ruling and second judgment ren-
dered 1n Teton CV 01-265, which deals most directly and immed-
iated of the possible further claimants of ownership to said 
40 acres and said contended plaintiffs' right to a 60 foot 
westerly easment. Such litigation and ruling/second judgment 
have been served upon plaintiffs herein, but they have shown 
no concern of the legal effects and controlling aspects of said 
Teton CV 01-265 nor hHve plaintiffs made any efforts to serve 
not just such named parties in Teton CV 01-265, (which) are 
indispensible parties, among such being Milan~~4ndiDiafi~9/V~-~~ch 
Cheyovich, who in said T~ton CV 01-265 are stated to own an 
undivided one-fourth ownership is said 40 acres. Until such 
service of indispensible parties is accomplised and this action 
is consolidated with Teton CV 01~265, this court will be seve-
rely prejudiced, and the rights of defendant herein further 
prejudicially unresolved with finality. Due to the current 
lack of service upon ibdispensible parties known to plaintiffs 
and the lack of consolidation and joinder herewith of this act~ 
ion and Teton CV 01-265, defendant reserves unto himself fur-
ther rights of amendments to these affirmative defenses and 
nhe counterclaims which he, infra, avers. 
13. Defendant prays that plaintiffs are precluded from cont-
inuing in any capacities or standing with this lawsuit until 
thet~have ser~ed all indipsensible parties and filed approp~ 
riate motions for joinder of thhir claims to that of Teton 
CV 01-265 and then,~in such event, they be granted :ab.sdJutcly 
no relief, legal or equitable, no costs, no award of attor~~ys 
neys fees, and that they and their counsel ~e sanction(ed) 
for violations of Rule ll(a)(l) and JL1(<{}(B)(2) and per the 
inherent powers of this court for pursuing a specious, fri~ 
volous, vexatious and without merit lawsuit.'' [ R: 112-114) 
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Besides the foregoing affirmative defenses put squarely 
1n issue by appellant's verified answer and a£firmatiu~n , 
defenses, his "C. COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS" (.R: 113-
116) appellant incorporated by reference per paragEaph "C, 1, 
p~r I.R.C.P, Rule 13(a) (and also Rule lO(c),) all of his 
statements and averments of his Parag~aphs A. 1, through 5, 
B., 1 through 13, as part of his Statemens Facts, per Rule 8, 
est seq and Rule 9(c)(d), et seq against ~~11 plaintiffs, their 
counsel, surveyors and consultants." C R: 113) 
Under, and per appellant's verified paragraphs "C., 4., 
through 6. , C R: 114-115) he set forth more spec i fie counter-
claims/counts seeking recover, qu~et title and damages, to wit~: 
"3. Counterclaim JOHN N. BACH has been defrauded, decei-
ved and had his property and portions ahdY~i~hts of posses-
sion, use, occupancy and quiet maintenance, coverted, des-
troyed and trespassed by each and both of the plaintiffs 
for which he seeks full fuonetary and comperisatory damages, 
4. Counterclaimant JOHN N. BACH seeks an order for quiet 
title com~letely tohimself on/as to anu such claimed 60 
foot easement by plaintiffs, the entire remaining 40 acres, 
to which/but only an undivided xh:reer::fiuurthoownership is to be 
confirmed and to no'1.one else. 
Sf. Counterclaimant JOHN N. BACH,seeks damages and other 
injunctive/equitable relief for the plaintiffs and each of 
their breached of the implied/express covenants of good 
faith and fair dealings, finding further that per the equit-
able doctrines set ofrth in the foregoing incor.porated affir-
mative defenses, plaintiffs are barred by each, all or any of 
said defenses.and are precluded from continuing with their 
counts herein or any other legal action seeking to deprive 
counterclaimatnt of any right, title, ownership or interests 
oth~r than as he has averred, seeks and requests relief from 
this Court. 
6. Counterclaimant incorpoates all of the paragraphs C., 1 
through 5, supra herein and seeks that he be awarded damages rr 
and ameliorat@ry relief for the intentional interence, by 
plajmtfffs of his existing contractual rights with the Cheyovichs 
and others, his prospective and economic relations and advan-
tages, developments, etc., of said 40 acres he has lost or 
sustained by plain~iffs/counterclaim defendants ULRICH's tort-
ious conduct." C R: 114) 
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Appellant's prayer and verification are set forth in 
TR: 114-115) 
(SEE NOTE 1, infra.) 
~e~pondents'' REPLY TO cou:tHERCLAl¥. was filed Dec, 3, 
2010, URi 116·d2ll 
A MINUTE ENTR~ was £tled January 11, 2011 at 4;49 p.m, 
rea Jan, J, 2011 Telephone Status Conference, all ;parties 
he,rein appearing:telephonically, wherein the district court 
set the pretrial Condernce fo,r Priadya, May 6, 20llat 1:30 p.m. 
and 11 the Court Trial lasting for three (31 days from June 8, 
2011 thourgh June 10, 2011, both hearings to be heard in Teton 
County! 1.'' CR; 122.,-.124} 
On March 12, 2011, Respondents l· M.OT(I)ON .FOR SUMMARY JUDG-· 
MENT was filed? supported by Th.oms H. Ulrich1·s Affidavit 1n 
SUJ?POI\T'plus the '.Memorandum filed therewith. CR: 115-118} ;: 
The AFF~DAYJ:T OF TIJOJ1AS H. UL~}'Cf;t;:~· h;i,d attached to it, t5Jx•:c: 
(6)_ e;xhil}its, to wit: Exhibit A, copy ~Jof::a deed transferring 
title to the Ulrich Property, as defined in the Verified Complaint 
from P,hi:l t:P J. Sarasqu~ta and Mar i ly·n ~R, ~arasqueta, husband 
and wife, and Louisa S, Saraqueta, Trustee of the Sarasqueta Liv~ 
Ing Tr1;1.st, dated October 30, 1990 to Thomas H. Ulrich and M,ary· 
Ulrich, husb-and and wife;n. Exhibit B, a copY' of deed transferring 
title to an additional 30 acress of properY', adjacent and conti" 
\' ," '.' .. ,. 
.. 
NOTE 1; J1;1.ly' 26-~ 2010 AJ?pe11ant received an ORDER, in Supreme Court, DKT 
NQ, 39318,2011 Teton CO'!) No 2010-329 denying .lids Petition/Motion 'For I:mpos;;., 
ing Extraordinary Appell~te Procedure, 't .A~ R~ R;ytle 42, J0INING and CONSOLJ'D-. 
ATJ'N.€1, 1\B:I?EA.L OOCKET NO, 393:£8.,..2011~ TETON CV'"2010.,-.329, Appellant in Supreme 
Court DocRet Nos 33370·-2010~ has £Ned a Petition for :Rehearing and submitted/ 
;filed aM,ernorandtlTil Brief in Support thereof; appellant therein has raised, 
a:r~ed and suom~tted that J]iudge Da~ren B! Simpson, neither had the jurisdict-
tlon~any authorized or empowered d1scret1on toenter Octo 29, 2010 his SEGGNB 
AMENDED JUDGMENT therein. There is no final decision/order in;said Dkt 38370-2010. 
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grantors as EXHIBIT A, to both respondents as husband and 
wife); Exhibit C was a copy of title insurance (o£ Exhfubit 
A real propertyJ which was dated Dec. 11 15 19_96,') HJ;aJ:mrwhich~e:x'cl-
uded "4. Lack of a right of access to and from the land'o'; 
Exhibit D, ancopy of title insurance f of Exhibit B.real 
property) which was dated Dec. 11, 1996, 10:07 a.m, wfuid'lexcluded 
"4. Lack of a right of acess to and from the land'.'; Exhibit 
E, copy of a deed from T~ton West Cor~oration to the Sarasqueta, 
husband and wi~e and the trustee (predecessors intetes~ to the 
Sarasquet-a:t Living Trust dated June 9,, 1994, BUT NOT RECORDED 
AS INSTRUMENT 116576, on nJUN 17, 1994"; and Exhibit F, copy of 
CORPORATION WARRANTY DEED, dat.ed "JUN 14, 1994", as. INSTRUMENT 
116461, from TETON WEST CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, 
doing bsuiness in Idaho, (transfering the 40 acres parcel, 
identified as PEACOCK PARCEL, to: "JACK LEE McLEAN, Trustee 
of the JACK LEE McLEAN FAMILY TRUST, as to an undivided 
one-fourth interst' MILAN CHEYOVICHand DIANA CHEYOVICH, 
Trustees of the CHEYOVICH FAMILY LRUST, as to an undiv-
ided one-fourth interest; WAYNE DAWSON, Trustee of the 
DAWSON FAMILY TRUST, as to an undivided one-fourth int-
erest; and TARGHEE POWDER EMPORIUM, LTD, as to an undiv-
ided one-fourth interest .• " 
(' R: 135-164) (NOTE 2.) 
CNOTE "2':~· respondents 1 mot1on for summary Judgment dJ:d not seek 
any summary judgment on the affirmative defenses and counter-
claims raised by Appellant's verified ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS: 
rather in the last paragraph 4, by respondentssthey asked~ 
"For an Order from the Court dismissing all of Defendant John 
N. Bach's counterclaims against Plaintiffs", without submitting 
any notice of hearing on such ambiguously phrased request for 
dismissal and without and submitted any points or authorities 
to grant such motion to dismiss which was way dilatory to make 
14 
under I . R • C. l? , , R u 1 e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) . ) ( T R : 1 2 6 ) In fact , the I as t ~ 
full paragraph of tespondents' motion for summary judgment, 
did not mention at all or submitta memorandum on any motion 
to dismiss. · R: 127) 
March 25, 2010 Appellant filed his AFFIDAVIT .. RE OBJEC-
TIONS AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
consisting of 12 pages ( R: 168-179) to which were attached: 
EXHIBIT 1., certified c6pies of a JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT AND 
LIMITED POWERS OF ATTORNEY TO CLOSE ESCROW, entered into by 
the four joint venturers owners via their family trusts and 
appellant's business name Targhee Emporium Emporium, Ltd., (~R: 180-
183) which was recorded Jun 14,1994, at 4L30 p.m.; EXHIBIT 2, 
a copy dated Aprilc2009 of "IMPROVEMENT PLANS FOR GROUSE LANDING 
TETON COUNTY,JIDAHO" prepared for respondents, showing an already 
existing 60 foot county road and utility easement, to the North-
West corner of respondents approximate 39 acres, 1and such 60 
foot County road and utility easementsoutherly aleng/into 
respondents said 39 acres for approximately 3/4s of its length; 
(vR: 184); and EXHIBIT 3 , #p~~@~ 6£ six (6) cblored photo-
graphs showing the fencing, enclosing fences, keept out and 
no trespassing signs, restrictions and planted trees and ~ates 
along the western and and around the appellant's said 40 acres 
known as Peacock Propertv.put up since its purchase in June/July 
1994 and in place when and after respondents came to visit 
appellant and nis wife, in late summer 1994, which remain in 
place to this very date.(' R: 186-189) 
The following ·l•s.t!~~~s-·arE: outlined facts of appellant's 
Affidavit. 
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OUTLINES OF APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVIT 
Par .11: He's only defendant/counterclairnant served by respond-,, 
ents; his V:erilified A(NSWERO& 'MANDATORY COUNTERCLAIM is 
incorporated. (' R: 169) 
Par 2: No affidavit from Mary M.Ulrich; no power of attorney 
nor written authority for her llwibl:rndl·to'biml<twr. C'l~; ·169) · 
Paro 3: Attached Deft Exh. "1 ',' certified copy of Teton Insru-
ment No. 11642, ent:ttiled "JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT and 
LT POWERS OF ATTORNEY TO CLOSE ESCROW, incoupora ted. (' .R: 169) 
Par 4: Since purchase of 40 acres, kmrwn as "PEACOCK 40 Acre 
Parcel", he's been controlling owner, manager, resid-
ential occupier, with street address: 4000N, 1520E, 
Tetonia, but mailing address of P.O. Box 101, Driggs, 
I D 8 3 4 2 2 . (T'R: 17 0) 
Par 5. Peacock Parcel plus a 8.5 acre parcel, re known.as 
Zamona Casper llircel. currently sftbject of pending appeal, 
(Dkt No. 38370-2010), whereillrr1 Judge Simpson rendered Oct. 29, 
2010, a OHDER/\GRANTDNG rPJ.::A~INl'IFF WAYNE DAWSON'S MOTION FOR RELTIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT (21 pages) and SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT (2 pg)(R: 170) 
Par. 6: The Appeal in 38370-2010, per the foregoing ORDER GRANTING WAYNE 
DAWSON's MOTIONFOR RELIEF fROM JUDGMENT and SECOND AMENDED ,TIJDGMENT 
rendered without notice and holding of any hearing, thus violating 
appellant's rights, and is "unfathomable and impermissible", reveal-
ingJudgeSimpson's nonjurisdictional, wilful deliberate misstatements 
per said ORDER and SECONDED AMENDED JUDGMENT, per Idaho statutes and 
U S, Federal 'Supreme Court standards of both the actual presence of 
b1as and the reasonable man appearances of his bais againsat appellant. 
No appeal ever filed , nor could it be, that the ORDER dismissing 
Wayne Dawson's and Jack McLean's complaint, in Teton CV 01-265, with 
B.rejudice, can now w±thout any subject matter jurisdiction, being final 
Judgment, b~, in this action. be redone or modified, where such 
is nonexistent procedure,. C R: 170-172) 
Par 7: Judge Simpson's inappropriate evaluation of Affiant's appeal rights 
in 38370-2010, his actions, stiatemetns and evaluations, all incorrect 
in said appeal, 0 are not merely appearances of prejudice but actual 
prejudices, extra judicial and without jurisdiction, which require 
:his disqualification and recusal, as matter of law and imdenialable 
facts, nunc pro tunc, herein. ('TR: 172) 
Par 8: Before appellant's and joint venturer's purchase of Peacok Parcel 
he with Jack McLean --& · Joilll J3r-e~-vBr reali:t\ht for Trout Teton Ranch·,_and 
'Dhe:FAmily Hatch Trust, walked along.westerly boundary of 40 acre 
parcel saw in place, above gronnd an east valley eibectricity trunk 
:.ldme all along westerly boundary, which along with telephone utlity 
service "already in place for the land uses to north'.and west of 
PeacoG:k 40 acres pracel and to the North of it. CR:. 172) 
Par.9: Just to the NW. of Peacock Parcel, within 100 feet, was a large 
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electricirrigation pump accesible vla an easement eminating from 
(county) road SOON; this easement did not go/nor extend to 
any part of Pear:ock Parcel. Upon terms of purchase of Peacock, 
(as in EX. : ) l'R: 180-182) Affiant "erected barriers and posted 
signs-:; along I\TIV covners, Nly boundary, SW comderaand SW corner 
& Sly boudar;r; . of "NO Access allowed", "No TRESPASSING!,(, "Keep 
OUT", \Tand "NO HUNTING";fftom thereon, affiant woilild twice monthly 
check and maintain tfue access barriers and warning signs. Winter 
snow depths on said Peacok parcel, were 24-30 inch depts; no trees 
no wind barriers on 40 acres until June, 2004. ~ R: 172-173) 
Par 10: The claimed easement of access Mong inside Westrly boundary of 
Peacock, was per the advis of realtor Johnf Brewer, which "was to 
protect the 4 j 6.int ventuers personal2c&c. their trust's development 
of their indifrisihles.:&~.::, undivided one-quarter ovmership, to especially 
comply with then Teton County's newly being formulated zonging and 
planning code re family owned land splits. No understanding was 
reached of a 60 foot easment, either with said Joint Ventue·:of 
Spendthrift Trusts, nor was any 60 ft easement every agreed "to 
access any land or parcels north of or adjacent to the North of 
Peacock',' which Peacock Parcel did not haveany· irrigation rights 
granted to it via the large agricultural well, nor from Hogg 
Canal furtherly north of it, nor from South Leight Creek branch 
going SWly into/becoming Dry Creek or Bear Creek. (R: 174 
Par 11:. There was not any Ulrich Easement existing as contended by Plain-
tiffs, Attached EX. 2, solely for illustrative purpose is a 4/ZZ/09 
drawing of plaintiff's engineers for Grouse Landing, which 
reveals plaintiffs' parael ;was already accessed Jlr'ia roads and 
utilties, underground, via roads in place to it, by owners/developers 
sfi£EWJ\tERTRANCH . SUBDIVISION~, (from county road SOON). . 'R: 174) 
Par 12: Affiant did know of respodents until late July/early August2004, 
when they drove up 400N onto the raadaalong affiant's Southern 
boundary (called Summit View) ('R: 8) 
Par 13. On their:: first meeting plaintiffs drove paat wooden posts~ rails an:::. 
and existing gate with "No Trespassing , Keep Out and Stay oOmt, etc. 
signs posted by affiant, Steve Ulricha::;asRedfCJ~· permission to travel 
over the easterly portion of Peacock so as to reach some 6plus dou~ 
ble high beehives, llXJica,teld:. Uin J:b.iddle of Ulrich 1 s p[roperjzy which 
was in a Dept of Agriculture CRP progam~, "Affiant only gave very 
restricted access verbal1 withdrawable at any time, and only when 
Ulrich would stop and ask again"for such permission from affiant or 
his wf£e. No other person were given "such restrictive and limited 
access." Mfiant had in place his obstructingfences, rails, barriers 
and gateswith No Trespassing signs/warnings." ('R: 176) 
Par 14: On this initial meeting .and during plaintiffs' mid to late summer 
visits, Affiant informed plamntffs he. woult not allow any other 
access and told plaintiffs of several civil action involved in 
that he obtained injunctions against various defendants, who had 
trespass over first 100 feet of hfus westerly boundary and he would 
be installing more permanent and secure gates \{li({'ft said 100 feet 
~ .. 1:7,. 
H 
to protect hiw wife and hfumself ~ as,rthey had been threatened to 
be severly, threatened to oe :Killed, beaten or · maimed by 
various defendants in existing lawsuits. Plaintiffs ,made no 
objections nor any opposition to affiant's access restriction, 
barriers, fences or gates~~-Plliaintiffs used animal trails to reach 
their beehives, within an hour or so, the left going past then 
existing fence 15anriers and warning signs. C-R: 01761 
·r 
Par, 15: Through SUJT111ler of 2008,. plaintiffs twice visited the.ir beehives, 
"alwaysstopping at Affiant 1·s ·mooilehome to ask permission, ~m~l • 
le9,ving honEil;y, filled. trays for· AFfiant and his wife',' During these 
stops:~ ''plaintiffs both would ask questions arid inquire abou,t the 
permaent injunctionAffiant had obtained against such threatening 
defendants in the pending TEton civil actions, By 'May 2006, affiant 
had erected ,more pennanent 15arriers, placed signs, planted trees, ,. 
shrubs and positioned large :rod<s oostacles and barriers, etc,, 
(Described are no of fences, sight and winde barrirs, gates, , 
a.1lred signs with some 20.,..30 pairs of ski~ ~etc) In last 2008 visit 
by Plaintiffs asked affiant how· severe winters were and travel 
concerns if they proceeded to build a vacation home on their 
parcel;.nhat Mr.· Barlow, developer of S:ftillwater Subdivsions, to 
west and north of their property·· ;;''had provided several co,rrjplete 
ac{;~~i:ble roads cmd complete unaerground utilities/services to 
h. thel:!' parcel, frQJ1LB.oad SOON, with further access through and via 
other subdivisions."· Plaintiffs never discussed any cormnercial or 
subdivsion plans or implementations thereof, on their property but 
"only for their personal seasonal'/vacatmon home. (.R: 176~ 177) 
Par 16; I:n late June, 2009, Affiant visited in front of fuis mobile home 
byThomas Ulrich,· in full view of all of all such improvements, fen-
ces"; .gates~ ba:hriers and no trespassing signs, etc. Ulrich inquired 
if affiant would "agree to grant him a 25-30 easement of access 
only within Affiant's westerly boundary to an area on his parcel where 
he wanted to build a seasonaJJ residence." Affiant said "NO~ r;r and 
told Ulrich he already· had access from SOON, renumbered SOOON, 
questions Ulrich'' s reasons and motives .. for 25~30 easement request, 
stating '!stating in no uncertain terms, • there was no easement nor 
would he consider such requested 25-.30 foot easement." (.'R 1778178) 
Par 17; Attached are several co lor phots CExhi bt 3 attached) whic depict and . -
accurately' reveal appearances of "most southwesterly fences, signs,' 
barriers,· etc. which Thomas Ulrich saw on his said June 2009 visit. 
On said June 2009 visit by Ulrich,~discussed with Affiant was the 
"untimely and wrongful death of Affiant's wife, Cindy, while under 
the care of Teton Valley Hospital (in Driggs), her death occuring J: ;;:· 
either on late Nov. 7, or early Nov. 8, 2008," and that "June 28, 
~', ,affiant was effected by a stroke, throbotic c6Jjlplete." (:R: 178) 
Par 18: Plaintifffs have never given notice <Do affiant of their application 
for their residential or other subdivision plan, nor had the Teton 
County Plannirgf.bepartment until affiant had been se:rvedo with a notice 
of a hearing about a month ago "which never took placeJ' (TR: 178) 
Appellant's notarized siggature is set forth on ·lR: 179. 
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ISSUES XN THIS APPEAL 
L. LACK OF PERSONAL AND SUBJECT 'MATTER JURISDICTION 
2. COMPLAINT,, S FAILURE T() STATE ANY' CAUSE OF ACTION. 
3. REQUIRED DISQUALI'FICATI0N,RECUSAL OR RBMOVEL 
ASSIGNED DISTRICTC00URT JUDGE. 
4., ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW (,AMONG CONTUMACIOUS REFUSAL) 
BY DISTRICT COURT JUDGE TO 1\EQUI'RE RESPONDENTS TO 
PURSUE THEIR AVAILABLE, ADEqUATE AND I'MMEDIATE LEGAL 
REMEDIES. 
5. ERRORS, ABWSEi" OF DISCRETION, TO AWARD ANY' ATTORNEY'S 
FEES OR COSTS TO RESPONDENTS. 
( ', •• < 
.L< \._ 
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PJ\~Jt];ii~:rtfG ARGUMENTS TO ALL APPEAL POINTS 
Appellant's NOftCE OF APPEAL filed October 24, 2011 was 
timely·. (]\. 272.,..2772 Although the original JUDGMENT of June 
6, 2011 was ·modified by the FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT of October / ; 
_ _,---'it 
2011 extended the June 6, 2011 JUDGMENT to include and provide: 
''The Ulrichs 1 shall recover the follow;izng from Bach; 
attorney fees in the amount of $25,366.72; costs as a 
~atter of right in the amount of $219.0G~. and discre-
tiona.rycosts in the amount of.$35.000. Such fee· and._ 
costsamounts, tota.ling $25,628072, shall accrue interest 
at the lega.l rate· of interest for judgments fr om the 
date of entry· of this First Amended Judgment until such 
(lmount, plus accr~ed interest, has been paid in full." 
CR• 280, 267.,..272} 
R.esponden ts via such. F tRST AMENDED JUDGMENT, along with 
WAYNE DAWSON (lnd the very· deceased JACK LEE McLEAN, have in 
two (2) a.ppe(lls, Dkt;: 3837,0:-2010 and Dkt;34712-2007 (35334-2008), 
along with respondents herein, have taken three (_3) bits of 
the festering and regurgitating "apple" of lack of jurisdiction 
and ''VOIDNESS." 
!'•"""'" I~f Just the first two APPEAL ISSUES are decided in 
Appellant's fa-yor, reversing the FlRST AMENDED JUDGMENT, incl-
uding the -very• suspect and frivlous award of attorneys' fees, 
costs a.nd any further cited by respondents herein, then 
there will be established that thedistrict court failed to 
correctly and leg(llly apply the mandatory requir~ments of r.R.C.P, 
Rules 56Cal thro-qgh 56(el, that said FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT 
and this A~BEAJL have not been pursued ;frivolously or unreas-
a.bly • B'utter·s· V!' VaTidez (r'd App 2010) 241 P3d 7, Moreoever, 
Appella,nt befor~ the district court and in this Appeal cannot 
be shown to ha;ve ''a.cted without a reasonable basis in fact and 
law. H6ffeY V. ~~t1 ~f E6i~e, ffJ~~8 2011) 257 P.3d 1226, 1229. 
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AR~UMENT AND AUTHORIT1EES RB ISSUES 
ON APPEAL 
L. tACK OF PERSONAL AND SUBJECT MATTERS JURISDICTION 
The very initial question, as to the standing or capacity 
of appellant is~ IS HE SUED, NAMED AND SERVED AS A SOLE 
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT OR AS ONE OF OTHER JOINT VERTURERS AND 
OWNERS OF THE PEACOCK FORTY ACRE PARCEL? 
In Exhibit B, attach notarized uppyof a Corporation Warranty 
Deed, dated June 9, 1994, from Teton WEST CORPORATION, convey-
ing 40 acres to the there named trustees of family trust, McLean, 
Cheyovich and Dawson, and TARGHEE POWDRR EMPORIUM, LTD, each 
granted to have and own at that time of acquisition an "undivi-
ded one-fourth interest (R: 12-14), to respondents' complaint; 
such grantees are joint ventUilriD'Ii'~,lwh:o:Jare members, with said 
one-qu<itrt::e:rr undivided ownerships in a joint venture assocation. 
In appellant's March 25, 2010 filed AFFIDAVIT .. RE OBJEC-
TIONS AND OPPOSITION TO PLAillNTIFF MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
12 pages, (R: 168-179), he attachedas EXHIBIT 1., certified 
copies of the JOINT VENTURE AGREEMETN AND LIMITED POJ'\l'EJtS OF 
ATTORNEY TO CLOSE ESCROW, (R: 180-183). 
Respondents have never put into theirfc~~plaint or Thomas 
Uliich's AFfidavit for summary judgment any evidence that appel-
lant was not a joint veturer with siad oth®r three (3) initial 
jmint ventuvers. Respondents' averments in their complaint 
is more than specious, stating::·"4. On information and blief, 
Bach claims an interst in the following described real proper 
located in Teton County, Idaho, and situate to the south of 
21 
Ulrich Property (the 'Bach Property' J ; " (R: 3 J 
So why wasn't the PEACOCK 40 ERRE Joint venturer pacel 
property owners not served with proce§s and made the indis-
pensible party defendants? Respondents answer is fofund~ 1n 
REPLY MEMORANDUM, to their Motionffor summary judgment, 
whrein they cited Tower Asset Sub. Tnc., v. Lawrence 143 Idaho 
710 114, that 1'joinder of all parties with an interest in the 
subject matter of the suit is not requiredk rather, only 
those who have an inter§,sts. ;in; 1-,_the · <?bJe_cts of the suits should 
be joined." Respondents blatantly and corruptly ask the 
di~trict court jtidge to lo6k the other way despite they~ia~d 
"'-Al tough the other pro:Pet:r:t¥/ owners of the Bach i1!'-~l'f!;''W 
may have an interests in the subject matter of the suit, 
a property owners, only Defendant has attempted to inter-
feRe with Plaintiffs' interest in the propetty. Conseq-
uently, the other property owners do not have an interest 
in the object of the suits. Therefore, the other owners 
om the Bach Proerpty are not indispensble: parties." 
(Supp R; vol ;:009] 
But a Joint Venttpne is in the nature of a partnership, 
subjeci to the laws of pa.rtnership so far c:g substantival rights 
are concerned. Forbes v. ButTer, 2.42 P. 950, 956; ¥ost imp.,. 
ortantly, joint venturers stand in a fiduciary relationship 
and duties to each others Boyd V. Head 443 P.2d 473, 92 Idaho 
389. Therefore a joint venture is not an entity separate and 
ap:a:rt from the parties campo sing it. Clawson v. Gen~~"T Tnsur. Co. 
90 rdaho 424, 412 P.2d 597. Among the essential elements of a 
joint venture is the right of each member to voice, an equal 
right of cont~ol, of the direction of the enterprise. E~st~n 
v. · NeNabb 514 P.2d 604, 97 Idaho 180. 
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When respondents did not have appellant personally ser-
ved, (Page S-7, supra), they also failed to comply with. J4.tt~e!IJ• 
Rule 3(b) which mandates/requires a defendant to be named 
"as a person in a representative capacity ..• (he) is made a party 
to the action" or in an "action against a partnersip or unin-
corporated association." Also uncfer I.R.C.P., Rule 4(d)(4)(B) 
must be complied with. In Legg v Barina:ga,93&It\Edahocl2~5., 44-0 PZd, 
. ~4Sj,, a<, partmensfuipc; and individual members thereof were ordered 
to be made parties defendant to the action originally· commenced 
against one member of the joint venture and no summons was ever 
served o_y,:;anyi:efpthe~·cadded.Jpart:iaslfuor upon the partnership~ 
a valid judgment could not be rendered against the partnership 
nor against any individual partner. 
It 1s well known by respondents and the±r counsel, that 
MiJi® and Diana Cheyo10ich, as an undivided one-quarter owner 
of said Paacock Parcel live in Southern Californial If Wayne 
Dawson, is to be still an equal one-quarter owner he lives in 
Chico, Northern California, while Jack McLean is deceased and 
without any estate of personal representatives, but whatever 
daughter of his is still alive, she lives (both of them ):.in 
Canada. 
Such indispensible parties, per I.R.CP, Rule 19(a) 
must be originally named in a new complaint by the resondents 
and the present complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. 
The foregoing pleading and service of all indispensible 
parties. who still may have ownership interests in PeacoGk , 
were known to respondents and most parLKularly Judge Simpson. 
They all in vi ted error. State \o. Pentico JGid App2012) 265 P .3d 519, 528-29. 
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BlJt did the resondents even have NANM~·- equitable re-
medies cor ·we_re.:th_e_yrequired to plead whatever counts/claims 
ther sought 'a:s legal remedies which were available, adequate 
and immediate? Yes is the Answer, and appellant cited not 
just the Tron· E'asgle' De;v: .. QuaTitY' Designs Systems, Tnc. 
134 tdaho 357, 65 P.3d 509, 514, Gee page 7, supra reasserted 
herein in full, but more slgnificarnrtt:lty the follow·ing cases; 
1. Suchan· :v. RutherforE:l, 90 Idaho 288, 295, 410 P2d 434 
2Z. W'a.Tkin· :v,.· J?au1 {Idaho 1973] 511 P. 2d 781, citing and 
Suchan V. R.utherforg, supra, ("The basic underlying ~-u1 
rule is --equity will not intervene where the aggri-
eved party has a plain .. , speedy, adequate and complete 
remedy at law.") 
3. Gardner v. Fliegal (1969) 92 Idaho 767, 450 P.2d 901 
(Although the Idaho Suprme Court held, no on legal 
remedies at law dealing with easements, but auxiliary 
to that, an "easement is a right in the land of another; 
(and) one cannot have an easement in his own land.") 
(This case along with others expanding such rule, set 
forth, infra, page , preclude entirely respondents 
from even claiming a quiet title, declartory relief 
and injunctive relief claims, where they never had 
any legal title granted to them over appellant's 40 
are Peacok Parcel, respondents never took possession, 
nor made any knowledgeable use, management or opera-
tion of their contended easement over appellant's 
Peacok Parcel, and more signifinantly, by the Gardner -
case and those cited, infra, page , by operation of 
law, the doctrine of merger, extinquished and destroyed 
an~vri~hts, claims or assertions~ whatsoever, to any 
easement across appellant's 40 acre Peacock Parcel. 
As will oe cited and ana1;y.t:zed infra, respondents deceit 
and dec~ption on contrivedly creating a false easement over 
the Peacock Parcel, was in flangrant violation of the Idaho's 
Statute of Frauds, I.C, 9-505(4), because "an express grant of 
an easement cannot be created br parol. Abbott v. Nampa Shh Dist 
No 131, 119 Idaho 5~4; (see infra) 
24 
Respondents complaint and the affidavit of Thomas 
uv:i-<itt{ did not plead any justifiable reasons for not 
joining and serving all indispenaible parties who are 
joint venturers with appellant in Peaco~40 Acre Parcel. 
•tM:il;'J,n & Dina Chey·ovich were never named nor served) 
The obvious reasons ~or a¥oidance to have personal 
serv1ce and inclusion of the joint venture in thair law-
suit is that it subjects, particularly Wayne Daw·ron, ··should 
.r-aise any- 51ackcb:lfpos s i ble standing or capacity for the 
two daughters of Ja~k McLean, long deeease~ to be served 
and brought into the action\~' .such would insuiee appellant 
his due puocess and equal protection, procedural and 
substa:i_nt;j;ve.\ rights to bu:n:im;i.p',, ~·or;oss-complaints and/or 
thirdy party complaints, against Dawson and said Mcltlzah ''·s. 
daughters, if they still have any standing herein. 
The entire complaint as filed and unprovenly persecuted 
against appellant herein, reveals the mindset of insurance legal 
policy and possible invol vment of Wayne lla wson and his wife, 
Donna Dawson, 3atill defendants, in Teton CV 01-265, which 
is still pending before this Idaho Supreme Court per a petition 
and submitted memoraridum in supporttthereof, of a petition for 
rehearing. 
The long delays and stalling/avoidances by this Idaho 
Supreme Court, in refusing to ru1~$?., admit and reinstate Judge 
Jon Shin±rdling's JOINT MEMORANDUM DECIONS AND QUIETING TITLE 
JUDGMENTS OF Sept 19, 2007, Nunc Pro Tunc, and restore appellant 
and the Cheyovich's sorely as the only rightful owners of the 
Peacock 40 Acres Parcel, waxes and wanes, more than arbitrarily, 
void, and patently corrupt decisions by Judge Simpson, 
in proceeding with absolute lack of and/or want of juris-
diction to destroy appellant's and the Cheyovich's owner-
ship, economic and buiness pursuits of their sole ownership 
of the P~~qrn~~ 40 acre parcel. 
To more succintly cover respondents utter failures 
to file a· vatid, properly noticedmnd legallysufficient 
motionfor summary judgment, per I.R.CP. Rules rs:i 16(a) (c) (d) sard:1(e), 
this argument appeal portions, addresses the utter ~.44\,IR! of subject 
matter jurisdiction and the utter failure of &§'p0ndentsto state any 
viable causes of action for :(1) quiet title, 2). declaratory relief, 3) 
preliminary inj~unction o& permanent injunctions. 
2. COMPLAINT'S FAILURE TO STATE ANY CAUSE OF ACTION. 
An express grant of an easement as claimed by the 
respondents, cannot be created by "Parol" Abbott v. Nam:R9l:cl 
School District No 131 119 Idaho 544, 808 P.2d 1289 
Abbott, etc. v. Nampa ,etc, 199 Idaho.,holclsclearly and 
contnolling: "An easement can be created only by a person 
who has title to or an estate in the servient tEnement. 
An easement may not create a right the the gra·.:...wr did 
not possess. The fact that a person attempt~ng to impose 
an easement intends to acquire the title subsequently 
and lim fact does not do so makes no difference. " 
Most signi:l!ic®t~Y:' controlling and applicable is the 
Rule "An easement is a right in the land of another; one cannot 
have an easement in his~awn lando" Gardner v. Fliegal (1969) 
92 Idaho 767, 452 Po2d 901. (see axso Sinnett v. Werelus, 88 
Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952, cited and followed 1n Abbot Vo Namva 
Sch. Dist. No 131, 119 Idaho 544 , 808 P.2d 1289 
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The Abbott v. Nampa School case, supra, applied 
the Doctrine of Merger, citing not·:,\ only Sinnett Vo Werelus, -:; 
supra, but a Nevada casej Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp 
109 Nev 842, 858 P.2d 1258 --"Where n;, party acquired tit::.o 
both servient and dominant tenements, the easement merges into 
the fee of the servient tenemento" 
The Doctrine of Merger of both the servient and dominant 
temements occurred on June 9, 1994 when appellant along with 
his original joint venturers were granted by Teton West Corp-
oration's Warranty Deed to the Peacock 40 acres Parcel. What-
ever a~gument made by respondents to the contrary is utterly 
false, deceptive and in violations of I.R.C~P. ll(a) (1). 
On said same date, not only did appellant and his cojoint venturens 
2knoiWof respondents' existence nor of their purchase over tw~ ])) 
.sixs Cfrldmoths:1:.::Ira t~:r ga:ant.£)fre sponden ts' trustee grant deed, ;r::~s 
filed on December 11, 1996. Again on this latter date, there 
was no granted, reserved, nor implied easement as respondents 
36 contrivedly and deceptively fabricated. Moreover, respondents 
own dee~filed/recorded December 11, 1996 also by the Docttine 
of _MergerK~Q:£ not deeds or instruments which created any ease-
ment over appellant's Peacock Parcel, nor even any part of their 
own 39 acres to the North of appellant. (See Page P 0 2., supra). 
Both the the Peacock Parcel and the respondents have no 
easement or right of way of 60 foot width or any width whatsoever 
within the western boundary of their respective parcels. 
For respondents attorneys not to have known such legal 
merger doctrine and legal effect and undisputable fact more 
than boggles the mind; it is an admission of actual traud and 
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proyes all the element~and factors fnat establish a prima 
facie ca1;1se/co1;mt for intentional ,misrepresentation. (It 
cannot be further ayoided, Utat respondents 1 summary judgment 
motion did not give:, the required notice, specific,ity. for 
the court to ~yen consider let a~ong embibe itself of 
whetner respondents: t summary judgment mot ion . included that 
of appellant"s affirmative answers and counterclaims. ~:E~ 
didn 1 t ~ C3ee supra, pages 16, par. 4 through Page 18, para.,-
graph 14} 
But there are two (2) ,more additional factors of decep.,-. 
tion and deceit by respondents1 ~~e:, [lJ The warranty deed 
~ - . 
issued to appellant and his joint venturers was vague and 
~mbiguous on its face and in its application. No parol evide 
ence was pleaded nor presented in the complainttto avoid the 
abe61ute applications of the Statute of Fita~ds, I.C. 9~508; subii'l· · · 
paragraph 4, which reads: "4. An agreement for the leasing, 
for a longer period than on (1) year, or for the sale, of 
real property of an interest therein, and such agreement 
made by an agent of the sought to be charged, is invalid, 
unless the authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed 
by the party to be charged." 
The object of the statut~of frauds is to prevent paten~ 
tial fraud by forbidding disputed assertions of enumerated kinds 
of contract without any wirtten bais Frantz V. Parke, 111 Idaho 
1005, 729 P. 2d 1068 (Ct.App. 1986). · .. The failure to comply with 
... ~ ..... 
the Statute of Frauds renders an oral agreement, ifthere was 
one, unenforceable, both in a~~~tJion at law for damages and 
In a suit in equity for specific perhnrmance. Hoffnia:ri v. SV Co. 
1 o 2 Idaho 1 8 7 , 6 2 8 P . 2 d 218 Cl 9 81 ) . 
" 
' 28 
The second factor, (2), the Illegality of any contract or 
even a warranty or grant deed can be and musttbe raised at 
any stage of the litigation; the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
district court judge has the duty to rais~~i11eg~ltryof Ulrich's 
two deeds to create a nonexpressly granted easement that is 
barred by the Statute of Frauds. Pines Grazing Association, 
Inc., v. Fyling Joseph Ranch LLC 265 P3d 1136, 1139~1142. 
Thusly, a jurisdictional question is so fundamental, that the 
appellate and district court, must a~dress the issue of jurisdic-
tion if no party has raised it. State v. Johnso . (1ov 2011) 
266 P.3 1146 
Appellant will not tell nor state for respondents' benefit ; 
and use, what l~gal remedies or even equitable remedies might 
be available, becuase a-ppellant believes on the status of the record 
3dil.@;:ta':ttempted · wrongful offers for summary judgment; there aran·:t 
any at law or equity. If even there we~ theapplicable statutes 
of ~imitation Of five years and three years are long ago expired 
and preclude any attempt to amended the complaint against 
appellant, either at law or in equity. Such pleading attempt 
,Would be further misrepreentat.i0n and other claims being viola ted 
of appellant's ownership in the Peacock 40 Acre Parcel. 
R,l::t;spondents ;fgiled to plead any, yiable claim or cause o£ action for 
quiet title~ declaratory relief and injunctive relief. The failure to 
plead or prove a cause of action can be raised at any time IRBPr 
Rule 12 (g) C4l. But respondents did not go and prevail at 
trial; theirs was a wholly unsupported summary judgment motion 
per tRcr, Rule 56 Cal, CclC:dl and Ce). 
Even be£~~e respondents summary judgment motion, Judge 
Simpson's Memor ~Hecision Re; Plaintiffs' Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunctinn, etc., (R: 47-99) which included as Exhibits 
A and B, Judge Simpson's ORDER GRANTING BB.NANTING WEYNR BJlWSON 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT In Tetonc CV 2001-265 (R: 74-93) 
and SECOND AMENBED JUDGMENT, in that same CV 2001-260, (R 96-991, 
was completely in error in all regards, How could Judge Simpson 
have failed to see that the doctrine of merger v1a the Abbott 
case, supr and the Idaho Statute of Limitations, I.C. 9-505(4) 
did not create an utter lack of jurisdiction and a complete 
failure to have plea and even via any trial on the complaint's 
averments be aliliowed to go to the trial.? 
The MEMORANDUM DECISION was not just in error but 
wrong as to the fact there was a lack pf personal jurisdiction 
and subjecat matter jurisdiction, in that: 
1. He in error concluded the Court had personal jurisdiction 
over Appellat, but he never rules or acknowledged that 
Appellant was in a fiduciary joint venture association 
with the Cheyovich trustees of their FAmily Trust. Neither 
appellant nor the Cheyuuich had been named and served nor 
the Joint Venture associat~on of Peacock Parcel owneEs. 
(See errors at R: 59) 
2. He found that the complaint was properly verified when 
Thoms Uliich stated solely on information and belief 
the truth of his averments. But the truth was that 
there was no easement at all granted to respondents because 
the Abbott , case doctrine of merger had more than precluded 
extinquished and void any such claim or evidence. (See 
error 59-60) At no point of respodents' complaint did 
Thomas Ulrich state under oath, notaF±zed that he personally 
knew of the facts of his own personal knowledge. The 
verification by him was specious, hearsay and without 
proper under oath statements per Rule 56(c)(d) (e). 
3. The warranty deeds, Ulrich 1-A and 1-B, were evn acknow-
ledge by Judge Simpson as having been executed and then 
purpoerted record a year and over four months after a-pel-
lant and his cojoint,, venturers record their~s on June 9, 1994. 
CSee errors R 60-64+ ,Jludge Stmpson even gets the wrong 
aates of Appellant· s de~d from Teton West Corporation.) 
"7" 30 ,. 
4. Judge S:iJw£on does acknowledge that appellant cited and 
reilie& upon the Iron Eagle Deve. LLC case, 138 Idaho 487, 
but without any citation of authority rules "Bach does not define(d) 
'adequate legal remedy' in this cae .. 11 :-';. and rules that appel-
lant must "assert what other legl remd~ is avaiiable which would 
requries that this Cart disregard the injunctive relief the 
Ulrib.h's seek." (R: 64-65 (At this particular point Judge Simpson 
had become an attorny and advocate and is recusal should have been 
sua sponte. He was more than an unbaised judge--he was without 
knowledge of case law and the application of the Idaho Suatute of 
Frauds, I.C.9-505(4).} 
5. J6dge Simspon refuses to hear appellants motions wh~che~e 
ept 30, 2010, to which no opposition nor ob~ections had been· 
made or raised by respondents. Thus 15 dasy after appellant's 
motions were filed, they bee noticed although there were for 
October 15, 2010 and he directs they be refiled separately. 
(R: 65866) Judge Simpsnn:~cilciidn~t want to hear from appellant 
and his timely served and notice motions. 
6. Via his Ex A and B, attached from the Teton CV 01-265 
case he does acts and relies on a nonfinal, but still appela 
able case, and through his judicial suggestions and ruimngs 
which he can't reverse, he seeks to enforce and implement 
said EXIBITS A ~ I into respondents pleading, which the resondents 
never do and avoid completely, being protected and given legal 
umbre1la coverage by Judge Simspon igranting said Memorandum 
Dec is ion , (Err o r , R : 5 5 - 5 6 ) 
When the times comes to hear respondents summary judgment 
mo~ions, the foregoing biased, prejudiced and overlly premindset 
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rulin~s and order ts granted by Judge Simpson, in his ORDER 
GRATING J?LAI'NTI'F;F 1·S'MOTIGNFOR SUMMARY JUDMENT, filed June 6+, 
2011. (R; 197~226) The initill judgment was filed June 6, 2011 
CR: 227~230) However an ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT JOHN BACH's 
RULE 59 adn 60 'M,OTION AND GRATNI'NG IN PART PLAINTFF'SREQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, was filed Sept 13, 2011 (R;254~273) 
Without notice or any hearing set, heard or ruled upon, a FIRST 
AMENDED JUDGMENT, filed Octber 21, 2011 was filed. (R: 278-
ALL OF THE 'F1DR1EGOING~·o~,D~S AND ORIGINAL .JUDGMENT AND FIRST 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ARE APPEALLED HEREIN AND TO BE OVERTURNED, 
VACATING THE ORDER GRANTI'NG SUMMARY JUDGMEN'E FOR PLAINTIFFS 
AND T.HE FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT, WHTCH INCLUDES GRANTING RESPONIJENTS 
OVER $26,366.72; and retruning to the district court the pleaded 
affirmative defenses and counterlcaims, which respondent's summary 
judgment motions did not mention, address nor submit any affidvits, 
admissible, rlevant and applicable to eliminate the genuine ele-
ments of material facts raised by said appellants' pleadings. 
Verbillis v.· Dependable Appliance Co. (Ct.App 1984 107 Idaho 335, 
689 P2d 227. 
Under Rule 56(c) , appellant was not required to even file 
any counter affidavits, but he did both in his verification ANSWER 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES & COUNTERLCAIMS (R:lOS.,-.115) arld his AFFIDAVIT 
with Exhibits filed '.March 25, 2011, (R: 168-189) Thusly, appellant 
more than disputed and put into issue the overwhelming existence 
of genuine issues of material fact and the lack of subrnect matter 
< 
and even lack of personal urisdicion issues. 
The ORDERS GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ALONG WITH THE original 
JUDGMENT And FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT must be refferse, vacate with 
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instruction to the district court to dismiss with prejudice' . .c 5-~,::, _ 
respodents' entire four (4) counts and revers=ethe monetary 
judgment granted responaents of $26,366.72. 
The remaining ISSUES Number 3 and ~' supra, are not 
withdrawn nor l~(lj::N:red or aba'illdoned, as both the health of 
appellant and his physicall proclivities have precluded 
him, from compet~~g his arguemtsnand analysis of citations, 
cases and statutes, etc. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, July 30, 201Z 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT AND 
I the undersigned, hereby declare that on this date, 
July 30, 2012, Iddid mail overnight via delivery the next 
day in Boise, Idaho, P.0.83720-101, 
and Original and six (6) copies and one (1) unbound copy, 
to Clerk, Idaho Supreme Court, P.Oo Box 83720, Boise, 
I~ahn9 83720-010: and 
Two coprees to Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130, Idaho Falls, ID srro~ 
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